It is reversible error for the trial judge to prohibit the defendant from testifying that he was acting in self-defense when the court had already concluded that the arresting officer had not used excessive force.
Although a person can always revoke consent to a warrantless search, such a withdrawal of permission must be clearly and unequivocally communicated. So held the D.C. Court of Appeals in Ford v. United States.
There is a “buyer’s agent” defense in D.C. after all – at least with respect to drug distribution charges involving marijuana.
Like “reading the white space” on a police report (that is, focusing on what is NOT included), the “missing evidence” jury instruction “essentially creates evidence from non-evidence.”
For purposes of the misdemeanor sexual assault of minors statute, the D.C. Court of Appeals refused to limit the definition of “touch” to the act of “feeling” with one’s tactile senses — through, for example, the use of one’s fingers, hands, genitals or other sensory organs.
According to D.C. Court of Appeals decision in Odumn v. United States, “a landlord may not prohibit a tenant from inviting a third party onto leased premises for a lawful purpose, nor may the landlord prohibit such third party from entering or exiting the property through the property’s common space.”
According to recent D.C. Court of Appeals opinion, Foster v. United States, D.C. Housing Authority residents cannot be barred from accessing areas covered by their leases.
In Weems v. United States, 191 A.3d 296 (D.C. 2018), the D.C. Court of Appeals defines “possession, custody, or control” for purposes of Rule 16.
The evidence suggested that our client intended to exit the store, not damage property. There was also a question as to who actually broke the door.
In unlawful entry cases in which the defendant is charged with violating a DCHA barring order, the underlying order must be authorized by D.C. statute.