In Weems v. United States, 191 A.3d 296 (D.C. 2018), the D.C. Court of Appeals defines “possession, custody, or control” for purposes of Rule 16.
The evidence suggested that our client intended to exit the store, not damage property. There was also a question as to who actually broke the door.
In unlawful entry cases in which the defendant is charged with violating a DCHA barring order, the underlying order must be authorized by D.C. statute.
In addition to contemporaneity and spontaneity, the proponent of a “present sense impression” hearsay exception must prove that the declarant personally perceived the event described.
If the government introduces new evidence during re-direct examination, the defense has a constitutional right to question the witness about that new evidence.
The court found in Rahman v. U.S. that remaining in a restaurant for 10 minutes after being asked to leave was sufficient to be found guilty of unlawful entry.
In Crawford v. D.C., the Court of Appeals confirmed that the Leaving After Colliding statute requires the government to prove mens rea.
I tried to argue a while back that, when it comes to D.C.’s statute on Threats to do Bodily Harm, parking enforcement officers should be considered to be particularly immune to threats. After all, they are used to… Read More
Mayhand v. U.S.: “A Statement is Not an Excited Utterance Unless the Declarant is Manifestly Overcome by Excitement or in Shock.”
D.C. Court of Appeals Judge Catharine Easterly writes what I think. The difference is that she finds the words that elude me. And the words she writes impact D.C. law. Her impact continues in Antoine Mayhand v. United… Read More
The D.C. Court of Appeals has issued a number of opinions over the last couple of years in which it has refined the definition of “significant bodily injury” under D.C.’s felony assault statute. In Nero v. United States,… Read More