On the doctrine of “inherent incredibility” in Carrington

 The D.C. Court of Appeals will typically defer to the trial judge on any question pertaining to the credibility of a witness.  After all, it was the trial judge, not the appellate court, who witnessed the testimony in person.

A narrow exception to this deference is known as the doctrine of “inherent incredibility.”  Judges are only human.  A ruling can be so wrong – either logically or factually – that such deference is no longer merited.

An early case that helped define this doctrine in the District is the D.C. Circuit Court opinion in Jackson v. United States, 353 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1965):  “While the trial judge’s observation of demeanor must be given appropriate weight, it must be remembered that ‘credibility’ involves more than demeanor.  It apprehends the overall evaluation of testimony in light of its rationality or internal consistency and the manner in which it hangs together with other evidence.”

The doctrine can be invoked “if the person whose testimony is under scrutiny made allegations which seem highly questionable in the light of common experience and knowledge, or behaved in the manner strongly at variance with the way in which we would normally expect a similarly situated person to behave.”

In this particular case, the appellate court found that the police officer’s testimony contained “internal contradictions” and was “contrary to human experience.”

The doctrine of “inherent incredibility” was invoked most recently in the D.C. Court of Appeals case of Brittany Carrington v. United States, __ A.3d __ (D.C. 2025). 

In that case, the appellant tried to invoke the doctrine on the basis of major inconsistencies in the testimony of government witnesses. 

The D.C. Court of Appeals disagreed.  The test for “inherent incredibility” is stringent, it held.   And “a certain amount of inconsistency in the evidence is almost inevitable in any trial.”  After all, perceptions differ.  Memories fade.