Criminal Threats in Washington, D.C.

It is a criminal offense in Washington, D.C., to threaten bodily harm against another person. Misdemeanor threats are punishable by up to 180 days in jail and a $1,000 fine. D.C. Code § 22-407.

A threat to kidnap or injure another person—or to damage another person’s property—may be charged as a felony. Felony threats are punishable by up to 20 years in prison and a $50,000 fine. D.C. Code § 22-1810.

To speak directly with a D.C. criminal-defense lawyer with more than 15 years of experience, contact Jamison Koehler at 202-549-2374 or jkoehler@koehlerlaw.net.

What must the government prove for misdemeanor threats in D.C.?

To obtain a conviction for misdemeanor threats, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that:

• The defendant communicated words to another person;
• The words would cause an ordinary listener reasonably to believe that the threatened person would suffer bodily harm; and
• The defendant spoke the words for the purpose of issuing a threat or with knowledge that the words would be understood as a threat.

The government does not need to prove that the defendant intended to carry out the threat. Nor does it need to prove that the intended target actually heard the threat, provided the threat was communicated to someone.

See D.C. Code § 22-407; Carrell v. United States, 165 A.3d 314, 324 (D.C. 2017) (en banc).

When can a threat be charged as a felony?

Under D.C. Code § 22-1810, a person may be charged with felony threats for threatening to:

• Kidnap another person;
• Injure another person; or
• Physically damage another person’s property.

A conviction carries a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison and a $50,000 fine.

Although misdemeanor and felony threats share similar elements, the felony statute applies to threats of kidnapping, injury, or physical damage to property. The precise charge will depend on the words used and the circumstances in which they were communicated.

What is a “true threat” under D.C. law?

A “true threat” is a serious expression conveying that the speaker means to commit an act of unlawful violence. Rokhvand v. Herzfeld, 2026 D.C. App. LEXIS 302 (D.C. Aug. 27, 2026) (quoting Graham v. T.T., 347 A.3d 357, 365 (D.C. 2025)).

Cruel, insulting, or offensive language does not automatically constitute a criminal threat. Nor does a threat to embarrass someone or harm the person’s reputation or livelihood ordinarily constitute a threat of bodily harm.

Courts examine the words in context. Relevant considerations may include the relationship between the parties, their prior interactions, the speaker’s tone and body language, the circumstances in which the statement was made, and whether the speaker appeared capable of carrying out the threatened act.

What are common defenses to a criminal-threats charge?

Common defenses include the following.

The statement was protected speech

The First Amendment protects speech unless it falls within a recognized category of unprotected speech, such as a true threat. See Mashaud v. Boone, 295 A.3d 1139, 1144 (D.C. 2023) (en banc).

A defendant may argue that the words were offensive, angry, or disturbing but did not constitute a serious expression of an intent to commit unlawful violence.

The words were a joke, hyperbole, or angry exaggeration

A statement must be evaluated in context. Words that appear threatening when viewed in isolation may amount only to a joke, puffery, political rhetoric, or an angry exaggeration.

As the D.C. Court of Appeals explained in In re S.W., a threat is “more than language in a vacuum.” It is not always reasonable—and may sometimes be irrational—to take every statement at face value. 45 A.3d 151, 156 (D.C. 2012).

A reasonable person would not have believed the threat could be carried out

In Thomas v. United States, the defendant threatened to take a police officer’s gun and use it to slap him. At the time, however, she was handcuffed, guarded by two officers, and separated from the threatened officer.

The D.C. Court of Appeals concluded that a reasonable person would not have viewed the statement as a genuine threat under those circumstances. Following through would have required the defendant to escape her handcuffs, get past the officers guarding her, reach the other officer, and take the gun from his holster. 249 A.3d 802, 806–07 (D.C. 2021).

The case does not establish a separate requirement that the speaker always possess the immediate ability to carry out a threat. Instead, the speaker’s apparent ability to act is part of the surrounding context used to determine whether an ordinary listener would reasonably understand the words as a threat.

The statement was conditional or hypothetical

Conditional or hypothetical statements may not amount to criminal threats, depending on their wording and context.

In High v. United States, the D.C. Court of Appeals held that angry statements directed at police officers did not constitute criminal threats when the defendant was handcuffed, sitting on a curb, and speaking hypothetically about what he might do in the future. 128 A.3d 1017, 1021–22 (D.C. 2015).

The fact that a statement is conditional does not automatically make it lawful. The question remains whether, viewed in context, the words would cause a reasonable person to believe that the threatened harm would occur.

What intent must the government prove?

The government must prove more than the fact that the defendant communicated words that sounded threatening.

In Carrell v. United States, the D.C. Court of Appeals held that the government must establish that the defendant acted “with the purpose to threaten or with knowledge that his words would be perceived as a threat.” 165 A.3d 314, 324 (D.C. 2017) (en banc).

A person acts purposefully when the person consciously wants the words to be understood as a threat.

A person acts knowingly when the person is aware that the words are practically certain to be understood as a threat.

In Counterman v. Colorado, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the First Amendment requires proof of at least recklessness before speech can be punished as a true threat. Recklessness means that the speaker consciously disregarded a substantial risk that the words would be understood as threatening violence. 600 U.S. 66, 69, 79 (2023).

Counterman establishes the constitutional minimum. Under Carrell, the D.C. threats statutes require the government to prove the higher standard of purpose or knowledge.

Why hire Koehler Law for a D.C. threats case?

Jamison Koehler focuses his practice on criminal-defense, civil protection order, and anti-stalking order matters before D.C. Superior Court.

He does not divide his time among the courts of Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia. He does not practice in federal court.  Nor does he combine his D.C. criminal-defense practice with unrelated areas such as personal injury or family law.

This focus gives Mr. Koehler extensive familiarity with D.C. criminal law, Superior Court procedures, local charging practices, and the judges, prosecutors, probation officers, and court personnel who handle these cases.

Koehler Law offers both flat-fee and hourly billing arrangements, depending on the nature of the case. To discuss a criminal-threats charge in Washington, D.C., contact Jamison Koehler directly at 202-549-2374 or jkoehler@koehlerlaw.net.

Last updated: September 14, 2026