Then-existing “state of mind” exception to hearsay rule

Depending on the context, a declaration with respect to a person’s then-existing “state of mind” can be admitted either as non-hearsay or under an exception to the prohibition against hearsay.

Let’s say, for example, that the defense seeks to introduce the following statement by the defendant on the night of John Smith was murdered:  “I am afraid of John Smith.” 

If the defense seeks to introduce the statement or the truth of the matter asserted, namely, that the defendant did in fact fear for safety in the presence of John Smith, thereby justifying the defendant’s actions as self-defense, then the statement would constitute hearsay and could only be admitted through an exception to the prohibition against hearsay. 

If, however, the statement was offered for the sole purpose of explaining why the defendant left the house, then its purpose would be illuminate the effect of the statement on the listener.  In that context, it would not be hearsay. 

In either case, the statement should be admissible.  In neither case, however, would it be admissible as “substantive” evidence.  In other words, the jury would only be permitted to consider the evidence for the limited purpose for which it was offered.  Evans-Reid v. District of Columbia, 930 A.2d 930, 945 (D.C. 2007); Jones v. United States, 17 A.3d 628, 632 (D.C. 2011); Clark v. United States, 412 A.2d 21, 28-30 (D.C. 1980). 

The party seeking to introduce the statement does not need to prove “unavailability of the declarant.” McCormick on Evidence § 274.  Any person hearing the statement would be qualified to testify to it.  Id. at § 273. 

D.C.’s rule on the present “state of mind” hearsay exception is consistent with Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3).  Entitled “then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition,” that rules allows the introduction of “a statement of the declarant’s then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain or bodily health).” 

For example, the rule would allow introduction of the declarant’s statement of intent (e.g., “I am going to the store”) as proof that the declarant acted in accordance with that statement (that is, that the declarant did in fact go to the store). 

Other areas for admissible state-of-mind declarations could include mental health of declarant, guilty conscience, belief, fear, knowledge or notice, intent, motive, and feelings.  See David Binder, Hearsay Handbook, 4th Edition, § 2:09. 

However, Rule 803(3) does not permit the introduction of “a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed.”   In other words, focusing on “the declarant’s then-existing state of mind,” it does not allow backward-looking statements (e.g., “I was really depressed yesterday”).  As Leonard, Gold and Williams put it, otherwise “the state of mind exception would swallow the hearsay rule because every statement about something that took place in the past is, at least implicitly, a statement of the declarant’s memory of that event.”  Evidence, A Structured Approach, Wolters Kluwer Law and Business, 2012 at page 212.