Criticizing trial court, Court of Appeals reverses gun convictions

The D.C. Court of Appeals recently reversed four firearm convictions after concluding that police lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to stop the defendant.

But Johnson v. United States, No. 24-CF-0525 (D.C. Sept. 3, 2026), is notable for another reason.

Writing for a unanimous three-judge panel in her typically understated way, Judge Catharine Easterly criticized the trial court’s handling of the defendant’s motion to suppress.  Specifically, the opinion faulted D.C. Superior Court judge Erik Christian for accepting conclusory assertions about a confidential informant’s reliability and for failing to make the factual findings necessary for meaningful appellate review.

As Judge Easterly put it: “The court . . . must do its job.” 

What led police to stop Johnson?

MPD Officer Conner Johnson received information from another officer, Keith Cyphers, about a tip from a confidential informant.

According to the tip, a man wearing a white shirt, black shorts and blue shoes and carrying a black bag had a firearm. Cyphers also sent Johnson a screenshot from surveillance footage.

Johnson did not know the informant and had never worked with Cyphers. He knew only that Cyphers described the informant as a “reliable source” whom he had been using “for a while.” Johnson did not know what “for a while” meant or why Cyphers considered the informant reliable.

Police subsequently encountered Chance Cato Johnson about two blocks from the reported location. His clothing generally matched the description.

Police stopped and handcuffed him. During the encounter, Johnson acknowledged that he had a gun in his bag and did not have a permit.

He was subsequently convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm, carrying a pistol without a license, possession of an unregistered firearm and unlawful possession of ammunition.

Judge Christian denies the motion to suppress

Before trial, the defense moved to suppress the firearm and Johnson’s statements on the ground that police lacked reasonable articulable suspicion for the stop.

The government presented only Officer Johnson at the suppression hearing. Officer Cyphers — the officer who actually knew the informant and presumably knew why he considered the informant reliable — did not testify.

After hearing from defense counsel, Judge Christian indicated that he believed the government had already presented sufficient evidence to justify the stop. He did so before hearing the government’s argument.

Judge Christian reasoned that Cyphers’s knowledge concerning the informant could be imputed to Johnson and that police had corroborated the tip by finding Johnson nearby wearing clothing matching the description.

After the prosecutor argued, Judge Christian simply “endorse[d]” the government’s argument and denied the motion.

That handling of the suppression motion drew pointed criticism from the Court of Appeals.

Judge Christian failed to make factual findings

Appellate courts ordinarily defer to a trial judge’s factual findings on a motion to suppress.

But the Court of Appeals found no such findings in this case:

“we have no factual findings to which to defer because the court simply ‘endorse[d] [the government’s]argument’ at the suppression hearing”

The court cited Superior Court Criminal Rule 12(d), which requires a judge to state essential factual findings on the record when factual issues are involved in deciding a motion.

The criticism therefore went beyond disagreement with Judge Christian’s ultimate conclusion. The Court of Appeals identified a problem with the process by which he reached it.

A judge must independently assess an informant’s reliability

The Court of Appeals also rejected the premise underlying Judge Christian’s ruling.

The fact that one police officer considered an informant reliable did not establish that the informant was sufficiently reliable to justify a Terry stop. The government needed to present evidence allowing the trial judge to independently evaluate that question.

Courts, Judge Easterly explained, “may not simply rely on a police officer’s conclusory assertions.”

Yet the government presented virtually no evidence about the informant’s reliability. It did not establish how well Cyphers knew the informant, how they communicated, or the number, frequency or accuracy of the informant’s previous tips.

The one officer who presumably could have supplied that information — Cyphers — did not testify.

Corroborating innocent details was not enough

The Court of Appeals also found the purported corroboration insufficient.

The informant’s description was generic, identifying clothing and a bag but providing no information about such characteristics as height, weight, race, age or hairstyle.

The surveillance screenshot did not cure the problem. At the suppression hearing, Judge Christian described the person identified as Johnson as “identical” to the informant’s description. But the Court of Appeals noted that another man in the same image potentially matched the description as well.

More importantly, confirming innocent details such as clothing and location could not substitute for evidence establishing the informant’s reliability.

“Corroboration of innocent details cannot substitute for an independent foundation of reliability,” the court explained. “It can only supplement one.”

“The court . . . must do its job”

Perhaps the most striking language in Johnson concerns the trial court’s responsibility when reviewing police conduct.

Police must assess information from confidential informants before acting on it. But when the resulting seizure is challenged, the judge must independently determine whether the government has satisfied the Fourth Amendment.

“The court in turn must do its job,” Judge Easterly wrote.

The court cannot simply accept an officer’s characterization of an informant as reliable. Nor can it “rubber stamp a trial court ruling that is based on vague and conclusory testimony.”

The Court of Appeals concluded that the government failed to establish reasonable articulable suspicion for the stop. Johnson’s statements and the firearm should therefore have been suppressed.

The court reversed all four convictions and remanded the case to D.C. Superior Court.